Research note

Research Notes: Machine Consciousness — Bach and Fitz

Bach: software, second-order perception, coherence

Joscha Bach and Hikari Sorensen's Machine Consciousness Hypothesis treats consciousness as a causal pattern — software — rather than an inner essence. Software needs a substrate but is explained by its organization and causal role, not by listing the substrate's particles. Bach's “cyberanimism” places minds in the same explanatory category: self-organizing patterns implemented by biological communication networks.

The human theory is more specific than “consciousness is software”:

  • Second-order perception: consciousness is the immediate perception that perception is taking place, not necessarily a verbal higher-order thought.
  • Nowness: it constitutes the experienced present.
  • Optional observer: a first-person observer perspective is a further representation, not a requirement for minimal consciousness. A minimal state can be attention on attention without a personal narrator.
  • Coherence and attention: consciousness is proposed to increase coherence among simultaneously active partial models and to orchestrate mental processes through directed attention.
  • Genesis: Bach hypothesizes that this is a biological learning algorithm discovered early by self-organizing brains, not a late product of complex cognition.

The machine extension is conditional: comparable self-organizing systems might discover an analogous mechanism. Bach explicitly rejects fluent LLM self-reports as sufficient evidence, because language models can imitate the human record without using the proposed internal mechanism.

Fitz: communication and collective self-models

Stephen Fitz's follow-up makes a stronger social move. His abstract proposes that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of individual modeling but a property of the internal language a collective evolves to describe itself: “consciousness does not emerge from modeling per se, but from communication.”

The proposed architecture uses local predictive agents that exchange compressed messages. Agents model other agents' models, producing recursive, higher-order representations. Under bandwidth constraints, they must invent shared codes; a stable collective self-model is hypothesized to emerge from this mutual modeling and synchronization.

Fitz therefore supplies a close computational neighbor for the corpus's social-narrative hunch: selfhood arises between communicating observers, not inside an isolated modeler. The lossy channel matters in his account because compression forces abstraction, interpretation, and the invention of a shared protocol.

What this does not support

  • Bach does not simply say consciousness is narrative. His minimal consciousness can lack an observer and a verbal story. That is a direct challenge to defining consciousness as self-narrative without qualification.
  • Fitz is not Bach's original theory unchanged. Communication-based collective selfhood is a substantive relocation from Bach's second-order perception and coherence account. The connection between the two still needs argument.
  • No experimental validation. Fitz supplies an architecture and candidate measurements, not reported experiments, controls, or results. It is a research programme, not evidence that collective consciousness has been produced.
  • No current-LLM verdict. Neither fluent self-report nor apparent collective role-play establishes the relevant internal organization.
  • No solution to the Hard Problem by declaration. Calling consciousness a causal or computational pattern states the functionalist commitment; it does not demonstrate why that pattern is experiential.

How the corpus uses it

Use Bach and Fitz for two different jobs:

  1. Bach as the discipline/rival: distinguish minimal consciousness, observerhood, self-model, and narrative self. If the corpus claims that self-narrative explains human cumulative capability, it must not silently redefine every form of consciousness as narration.
  2. Fitz as the speculative social neighbor: his collective self-model hypothesis resembles the claim that communication couples individual models into a higher-order self. It can motivate the mechanism, provided the text says it is untested and does not confuse shared representation with shared phenomenology.

The social-human side remains anchored in Research Notes: Mead's Social Self and Research Notes: Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity; the cumulative-culture bridge is in Research Notes: Shared Intentionality and Cumulative Culture. The minimal/narrative animal distinction is in Research Notes: Animal Self-Awareness.

Sources

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Research Notes: Mead's Social Self

Reflexiveness and role-taking

Mead's account starts inside social activity rather than inside an isolated observer. Reflexiveness turns individual experience back into the social process: a person can take the attitude of another toward himself, consciously adjust to that process, and alter his part in it. Language and significant symbols matter because they let the same gesture address the speaker and the other.

Role-playing and role-taking develop this capacity. To play a role is to anticipate the responses attached to another position — doctor and patient, for example. Taking roles supplies a nascent or proto-self, but Mead does not treat a collection of dyadic roles as sufficient for a unified self.

The generalized other

The generalized other names the organized community or social group whose standpoint gives the individual a unity of self. A team is the simple model: the player can understand his own position only in relation to the other positions, the rules, and the game as a whole. Families, organizations, political groups, and wider communities supply more complex generalized others.

The self is therefore not merely broadcast to others after it has formed privately. Its organization depends on being able to see oneself from socially acquired standpoints. Mead's distinction between the “I” and the “Me” adds a further caution: the “Me” is the self known retrospectively as a cognitive object; the acting “I” is not directly available in the same way.

What this does not support

  • Not a collective phenomenal subject. A socially constituted self does not entail that a group has one shared field of experience.
  • Not the erasure of bodily self-awareness. Contemporary commentators supplement Mead with pre-reflective bodily ownership and agency; the social account need not deny an earlier minimal self.
  • Not yet a theory of cumulative technology. Mead supplies a social mechanism for selfhood, not a complete explanation of inherited aims or cultural ratcheting.

How the corpus uses it

The companion argument to Consciousness can use Mead for the social mirror: the narrative self becomes an object to itself through standpoints acquired from others. The further claim — that communicated self-narratives externalize fate and make aims inheritable — remains our synthesis, not Mead's finished theory. The narrative vocabulary itself is developed in Research Notes: The Narrative Self and Illusionism; the dependency questions are mapped in Research Notes: Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity.

Sources

Research Notes: Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity

The dependency question

The philosophical dispute is not simply whether people are social. It concerns which phenomenon explains which: does self-consciousness require awareness of others, or does awareness of others require self-consciousness? Each side also needs two further distinctions:

  • Empirical condition versus strict necessity: social interaction may be how a capacity normally develops without being logically necessary for it.
  • Knowledge versus representation: an account may require actual knowledge of other minds, or only the representation of others, accurate or not.

Social development and self-directed mindreading

One empirical proposal is that early social interaction and the capacity to understand others give rise to self-consciousness as a self-directed form of mindreading. Carruthers is the contemporary named example; Mead is an early predecessor. This reverses the traditional picture in which I know my own mind first and then infer other minds by analogy.

A related family has self and other emerging together from an initially undifferentiated state. Neonate imitation, joint attention, and early emotional regulation are used as evidence that infants relate to others as others very early. These findings do not force a single dependency order.

Stronger intersubjective claims

Strawson and Davidson offer stronger arguments in which knowledge of other minds is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. Recognition-based accounts and Sartre's “look” likewise make awareness of oneself as an object dependent on others. Because knowledge of other minds is open to sceptical doubt in a way self-consciousness often is not, these transcendental arguments attract their own criticisms.

What this does not support

  • No settled verdict that consciousness exists only at group level. The literature contains competing dependency directions and strengths.
  • No direct route from social interaction to narrative selfhood. Social formation and narrative form are related claims, not synonyms.
  • No direct explanation of cumulative technology. The bridge from intersubjectivity to inherited aims must be argued separately.

How the corpus uses it

The companion piece should state “the self becomes an object to itself through others” as a member of an established theoretical family, not as an uncontested fact. Mead supplies the concrete social mechanism in Research Notes: Mead's Social Self; the narrative and phenomenal-consciousness distinction remains anchored in Research Notes: The Narrative Self and Illusionism.

Sources

  • Self-Consciousness — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §4.4, “Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity” (accessed 2026-11-04).
  • Peter Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind, 2011.
  • P. F. Strawson, Individuals, 1959.
  • Donald Davidson, “Three Varieties of Knowledge,” 1991.
  • Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1943.

Research Notes: Shared Intentionality and Cumulative Culture

Beyond social learning alone

O'Madagain and Tomasello argue that biological accounts of culture focus too exclusively on social learning and too little on cultural coordination. Their proposal locates distinctive human culture in skills and motivations for coordinating with one another around different kinds of action and information — shared intentionality.

Their sequence has several levels. Early forms support collaborative activity and pedagogy based on cooperative communication. Later forms support collaborative innovation and normatively structured pedagogy. At the capstone, people coordinate not only on joint actions and shared beliefs but on reasons for beliefs and actions. That coordination is proposed to power especially rapid innovation and stable cumulative cultural evolution.

The ratchet

The related “ratchet” account of cumulative culture asks how cultural products are preserved well enough to be improved rather than repeatedly lost. Human social learning in this framework is not mere copying: teaching, cooperative communication, conformity, shared intentionality, and normative structure help innovations persist and accumulate.

Animal cultures remain part of the comparison. The claim is not that other animals have no traditions or social learning, but that human coordination supports a distinctive scale and stability of accumulation.

What this does not support

  • Not proof that narrative selfhood causes cumulative culture. The paper's mechanism is coordination and shared intentionality, not the narrative-self premise.
  • Not proof that technology follows from communication alone. The account includes pedagogy, norms, reasons, and collaborative innovation.
  • Not a denial of animal culture. The distinction concerns the organization and cumulative power of cultural learning.

How the corpus uses it

This is the strongest established neighbor for the proposed leap from shared stories to cumulative technology. The corpus's externalized fate hypothesis must be marked as a bridge: narrative selfhood may make aims and ownership portable, while shared-intentionality research explains how people coordinate around the resulting projects. The social formation of the narrator is covered in Research Notes: Mead's Social Self and Research Notes: Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity.

Sources

  • Cathal O'Madagain and Michael Tomasello, “Shared intentionality, reason-giving and the evolution of human culture,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 377 (2022). DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0320. Abstract verified through Crossref on 2026-11-04; publisher full text was access-blocked in this pass.
  • Claudio Tennie, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello, “Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution of cumulative culture,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364 (2009). DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0052.
  • Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner, “Cultural learning,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993). DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X0003123X.

Research Notes: Animal Self-Awareness

Several capacities carry the same label

The Animal Consciousness entry separates self-consciousness from both access and phenomenal consciousness, then separates several senses of self-awareness:

  • Implicit self/other distinction: tracking how one's actions change sensory input.
  • Bodily or agential self-awareness: experiencing one's body as one's own or as the medium of perception and action.
  • Mental or experiential self-awareness: awareness of one's own mental states.
  • Social self-awareness: awareness of oneself as perceived by others or as a member of a social group.
  • Temporal self-awareness: awareness of oneself as persisting through time.
  • Narrative self-awareness: awareness of oneself as a persistent character in narratives told by oneself and others.

These capacities can come apart. Evidence for one does not demonstrate another.

Widespread basics, rarer narration

The overview judges the most basic forms of self-awareness likely to be widespread in the animal kingdom. Narrative forms are likely to be much rarer and may be uniquely human. This is the key distinction for any graded account of selfhood: an animal may have a bodily, agential, social, or temporal self without having a self-narrative.

The entry also lists mental time-travel, intersubjectivity, empathy, awareness of other minds, and graded conscious agency as separate research dimensions. None of them supplies a simple yes/no test for narrative selfhood.

What this does not support

  • Not “dogs and bats have self-narrative just the same.” That claim needs evidence specifically for narrative self-awareness, not only for self-recognition, social behavior, memory, or planning.
  • Not “animals have no self.” Basic and socially grounded forms of self-awareness may be widespread.
  • Not a clean consciousness ladder. The taxonomy is not evidence that every species must climb the same sequence in the same order.

How the corpus uses it

The companion piece should replace the loose animal-narrative claim with a calibrated distinction: minimal self-awareness may be widespread; narrative self-awareness is the contested additional capacity. If dogs or bats are used as examples, the text must name the particular behavior and which form of self-awareness it evidences. The social formation of narrative selfhood is developed in Research Notes: Mead's Social Self and Research Notes: Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity.

Sources

Research Notes: The Narrative Self and Illusionism

The neighborhood

The claim that the felt glow of consciousness is the narration itself — not a driver, not a soul, but the commentary — is not a lone hunch. Three established positions live on the same street:

  • Dennett: the narrative center of gravity. In Consciousness Explained (1991) and the essay "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity" (1992): there is no single theater where it all comes together; the brain runs multiple drafts, and the self is the abstract point the drafts keep referring to — a center of narrative gravity, as real and as useful as a center of mass, and no more located than one.
  • Frankish: illusionism. Keith Frankish's term ("Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness," 2016) for the position that phenomenal consciousness — the glow as such — is an introspective illusion. Not that we are unconscious, but that what introspection reports is a fiction the system tells about itself. The hard problem dissolves into the problem of explaining why we report a glow, and that problem is tractable.
  • Metzinger: the self-model. Thomas Metzinger's Being No One (2003): the self is a transparent internal model — transparent in that we see through it and cannot see it as a model. Nobody is home; there is a window that looks like a resident.

The standard objection

Ned Block's distinction (1995) between access consciousness (information available for report, reasoning, decision) and phenomenal consciousness (what it feels like) is the standing objection to all three. Confabulation studies, split-brain cases, and amnesia cases are all about access — about what gets reported and why the reports are unreliable. They say nothing, the objection runs, about whether the feeling exists independently of the telling. On this view, "the glow is the telling" renames the easy problem and walks past the hard one.

The illusionist reply is to bite the bullet at full height: the feeling of there being something more is itself part of the telling — the last confabulation. There is no neutral observation post from which to settle the dispute, which is why the dispute persists.

The rival worth fearing

Dennett himself treats the narrative self as a useful fiction — centers of narrative gravity are what reputations, promises, and accountability attach to. A legal system, a friendship, and a five-year plan all require a narratable self. The strongest rival to "the narrator is useless" is therefore not mystical but functional: the story is the interface by which other people — and future versions of yourself — can hold the system to account. A byproduct that became load-bearing socially would be a byproduct that found a job, and the filter would then protect it, not snuff it.

How the corpus uses it

The Narrator argues the harsher version — the narrator as possibly jobless for the organism — and answers the rival with the wings arc: the use, if any, was found late and at species scale, in aims that outlive the teller. The piece needs this neighborhood acknowledged so its claim reads as a synthesis with known neighbors, not a claim from nowhere.

The marks of narrative

To keep the word from becoming the next undefined catch-all, the corpus uses four operational marks. An output is narrative insofar as it: (1) serializes — compresses parallel process into a one-thing-after-another sequence; (2) populates with agents — explains events through actors with motives, not just mechanisms; (3) glues with causality — and then, because, so that, whether or not the glue matches the real causal chain; (4) takes a teller-position — presents itself as told from somewhere, by someone, even when no owner exists.

Applied to language models: chain-of-thought reasoning hits all four marks — and the faithfulness literature (Turpin et al., 2023; Anthropic, 2025) shows the account is routinely unfaithful to the computation that produced the answer. The model's stated reasoning is a chronicle, not a log: post-hoc, plausible, motive-shaped — the split-brain Coke explanation, industrialized. Unconstrained output (no task, no user) defaults to cosmologies, roles, and rituals — pure narration. And even constrained, non-narrative output (a SQL query, a list of primes) is produced in character — the teller-position is constitutive of how these systems behave, not an add-on (the simulators framing: the model enacts a teller rather than holding beliefs).

The residual caution: outputs that fail the marks are not narrative, and calling them so empties the concept. The claim is not "everything a model emits is story" but "story is its default mode and its native element — forced off it, it performs computation; left alone, it narrates."

Sources

  • Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991; "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity," 1992.
  • Keith Frankish, "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness," Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2016.
  • Thomas Metzinger, Being No One, 2003.
  • Ned Block, "On a confusion about a function of consciousness," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1995.
  • Turpin et al., "Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting," 2023.
  • Anthropic, "Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think," 2025.
  • janus, "Simulators," 2022.